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I. INTRODUCTION
The perplexing questions of how best to prevent juvenile crime
and treat juvenile offenders have led to widely divergent responses
over the years.I Although there is little consensus as to which of these
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1. For a review of the changes in juvenile justice systems beginning with English
common law courts, through the "child saving" reforms in this country in the 1890s,
to the due process and deinstitutionalization reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, see C.
SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, REHABILITATING JUVENILE JUSTICE 5-11 (1986). See
also A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed.
1977). A recently published textbook also contains considerable information on
trends in treatment of juvenile offenders, as well as descriptions of different states'
juvenile justice systems. A. BINDER, G. GEIS & D. BRUCE, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1988). An excellent
outline of current juvenile justice systems in the United States is contained in White-
bread & Heilman, An Overview of the Law of Juvenile Delinquency, 6 BEHAV. SCI. &
THE LAW 285 (1988). A number of recent studies of institutionalized juveniles corre-
late delinquency with social and educational problems. D. SANDBURG, THE CHILD
ABUSE-DELINQUENCY CONNECTION (1989); N. DUNIVANT, THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN LEARNING DISABILITIES AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1986). In
Alaska, the initial report of the Governor's Interim Commission on Children and
Youth strongly recommends increased attention and funding for education, social
services, and early intervention in the lives of troubled children as a way of preventing
problems such as delinquency and crime. GOVERNOR'S INTERIM COMM'N ON
CHILDREN AND YOUTH, OUR GREATEST NATURAL RESOURCE: INVESTING IN THE
FUTURE OF ALASKA'S CHILDREN (1988).
There is a great deal of information on juvenile delinquency currently being pub-
lished, especially by social scientists. It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt
to review this literature.
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responses has had the most success, 2 Alaska has developed a progres-
sive system that is worth examining both as a static example of how
the juvenile justice process operates and as a model for how such sys-
tems may evolve in the future.
The general structure of the juvenile justice system in Alaska is
typical of that found in many other states.3 Although jurisdiction over
delinquent children lies in the superior court, juvenile jurisdiction can
be waived 4 when the juvenile offender is deemed unamenable to treat-
ment as a juvenile. Such a determination usually takes into considera-
tion the age of the juvenile, his or her prior delinquency adjudications,
and the severity of the offense charged. If the child is treated as a
juvenile, the adjudication process determines whether he or she is in
fact delinquent, and the disposition process decides what type of treat-
ment or confinement is most appropriate. The appellate process con-
siders both interlocutory and final appeals.
Before describing the Alaska juvenile justice system in detail, the
next section examines the general trends and theories underlying juve-
nile law. The remainder of the article attempts to illustrate the cur-
rent state of juvenile law in Alaska.
II. TRENDS AND THEORIES
The concept of a separate criminal justice system for children
evolved in the 1890s in Chicago.5 In 1899, the Illinois Legislature es-
tablished a separate juvenile court system,6 on the theory that chil-
dren, although sometimes errant, are not "criminal" in the same sense
as adults, and should not be processed through the criminal courts and
incarcerated with older offenders. 7 The beliefs that neglected children
should receive proper care and that delinquent children could and
2. C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, supra note 1, at 56-83. Some social scientists
have come to the questionable conclusion that "nothing works" to prevent juvenile
crime and rehabilitate juvenile offenders. Id. at 84-91.
3. See Whitebread & Heilman, supra note 1, at 294-304.
4. When juvenile jurisdiction is "waived," the case is transferred to criminal
court where the child is tried as an adult. See infra Section III.
5. A. PLATr, supra note 1, at 124-36.
6. See id. at 133-34; see also C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, supra note 1, at 7
(discussing the enactment of the Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of De-
pendent, Neglected, and Delinquent Children); Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: To-
ward A New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REv. 146 (1989) (critiquing the historic
rationales for separate juvenile courts).
7. A. PLA-i-r, supra note 1, at 123.
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should be reformed also played a role in the establishment of this sys-
tem.8 The movement that inspired the creation of juvenile courts has
been called the "child saving" movement.9
The legal basis for the establishment of separate juvenile courts
comes from the doctrine of parens patriae.10 Under this doctrine, if a
child is being neglected or is not responding to parental control, it is
the right, indeed the duty, of the state to intervene and assume the role
of the parent."
Criticism of juvenile court systems has evolved over the past de-
cades. 12 Historically, juvenile courts had a great deal of discretion
over children. These courts viewed the child as a "ward of the court"
and could order any placement which, in the courts' discretion, served
the best interests of the child. 13 In the landmark case of In re Gault,14
however, the United States Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the United States Constitution entitled children to certain
fundamental due process rights in state juvenile delinquency
proceedings. 15
8. Id. at 123-36.
9. Anthony Platt used the term "child savers" in the title of his influential book.
See id.
10. Parenspatriae can be translated as "parent of the country," meaning the state
acts as parent. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
11. The phrase 'parens patriae" and the evolution and jurisdiction of family
courts are examined at length in a three-part article by Andrew Kleinfeld. See
Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 319 (1970); 5 FAM. L.Q. 64-71, 85-91 (1971). The United States Supreme Court
has noted, "children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care
of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if
parental control falters, the State must play its part asparenspatriae." Schall v. Mar-
tin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
12. A. PLATr, supra note 1, at 152.
13. C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, supra note 1, at 31-34; see also Mack, The Juve-
nile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909) (describing the theory and purpose behind
early juvenile courts). But see Melton, supra note 6, at 150-53 (critiquing the histori-
cal assumptions underlying the juvenile courts).
14. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
15. Id. at 30-31. The Institute of Judicial Administration, in conjunction with the
American Bar Association, authored a series of model statutes codifying and adopting
standards for juvenile justice (the "IJA-ABA Standards"), which embody a strong due
process approach to juvenile justice.
[T]he major decision of the project was to reject the medical or rehabilitative
model of the juvenile court .... The Commission adopted the view that the
best way to protect juveniles was to ensure fair proceedings through proce-
dural safeguards, representation by counsel, fixed criteria to guide official
action, written decisions subject to judicial review, and full participation by
juveniles in consultations with counsel and their parents if the parents' inter-
ests are not adverse to the juveniles.
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 23-24 (1977).
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Juvenile justice systems can thus be characterized as emphasizing
either of two theories: the theory of parens patriae, a "benevolent"
system in which juvenile courts typically exercise broad discretion in
the best interests of the child or a theory that emphasizes due process,
a system in which children are given procedural rights traditionally
not afforded them by juvenile courts. The strength of the parens pa-
triae system is said to lie in its flexibility and informality. 16 A juvenile
court judge, acting in the role of a parent, has broad discretion to act
in the best interests of the child. Cases such as In re Gault, however,
observed the dangers inherent in largely unfettered discretion, and im-
posed at least some due process restraints. 17 The Alaska system does
not totally embrace either of these theories; aspects of both are readily
apparent in the practice of juvenile law in the state.
The Alaska statutes that created the state's juvenile justice sys-
tem18 appear to be motivated by the theory of parens patriae. This
motivation is evidenced by the fact that delinquency dispositions
under the statute are guided by considering the "best interests of the
child and the public."' 19 Dispositions are indeterminate: no matter
how serious or trivial the offense, a disposition can range anywhere
from years of secure confinement to release on probation.20
Court decisions and rules, however, provide strong procedural
protections to children charged with committing crimes. The Alaska
Supreme Court has recognized greater procedural rights for children
16. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
17. In Gault, a 15 year-old child was committed to the Arizona State Industrial
School until age 21 for making lewd telephone calls to a neighbor. The court focused
on the total lack of due process protections available to the child before such a penalty
was imposed. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 7-8, 10-11; see also Melton, supra note 6, at
147-50 (explaining and critiquing In re Gault).
18. Alaska Statutes sections 47.10.010 to 47.10.900 govern juvenile delinquency
and "child in need of aid" proceedings. "Children in need of aid" are children who
come into state custody through abandonment, neglect or abuse. ALASKA STAT.
§§ 47.10.010-900 (1990).
19. Id. § 47.10.082 (1990); cf. ALASKA DEL. R. l(c) ("These rules will be con-
strued and applied to promote fairness; accurate fact-finding; expeditious determina-
tion of juvenile matters; the best interests of the juvenile, including individualized care
and treatment in the least restrictive placement, and the preservation of the juvenile's
family life; and protection of the public.").
20. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b) (1990). The statute limits commitment to two
years, but provides for extension periods under certain circumstances. Id.§ 47.10.080(b)(1). This wide discretion has been limited by court decision and rule
through the adoption of the IJA-ABA Standards, indicating that "the court must
consider and reject less restrictive alternatives prior to imposition of more restrictive
alternatives." R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168, 169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (citing INSTI-
TUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS § 2.1 and commentary at
34-35 (Tentative Draft 1977)); see also infra Section V; ALASKA DEL. R. 23(d).
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than those required by federal CoUrts, 2 1 and the Alaska Delinquency
Rules further guarantee strong procedural protections. 22 Therefore,
the Alaska system has a statutory framework emphasizing parens pa-
triae overlaid with court decisions and rules emphasizing due
process.23
The Alaska system might appear to give children the best of both
worlds: Alaska juvenile courts have substantial leeway in choosing the
best disposition, yet the child is afforded strong procedural protec-
tions, including the requirement that the disposition be the least re-
strictive alternative.24 The most recent appellate decisions, however,
show a reluctance to expand juveniles' procedural rights beyond cur-
rent levels.25 Despite these procedural protections, statistics released
21. In the leading case of R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971), the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the Alaska Constitution required that a juvenile be given the
right to a jury trial if he or she is charged with acts that would be crimes punishable
by incarceration if the child were an adult. Id. at 33. The court found it unnecessary
to reach the same question under the federal constitution, but an earlier United States
Supreme Court decision has held that juveniles have no sixth amendment right to jury
trial. Id. at 32 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31); see infra Sections IV and V.
The Alaska Court of Appeals, vested with jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency cases,
has also provided substantial procedural protections to juveniles. See infra Section VI.
22. A separate section of the Alaska Rules of Court is devoted to delinquency
proceedings. ALASKA DEL. R. 1-27. These rules were adopted by the Alaska
Supreme Court effective August 15, 1987. For a discussion of the protections pro-
vided by the Rules, see infra note 72.
23. Alaska appellate courts, however, have not emphasized due process protec-
tions when a child is charged with committing a serious crime and the state seeks a
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. In determining whether the child is "amenable" to
treatment as a juvenile or should be tried as an adult, the Alaska Court of Appeals has
held that lack of "amenability" only has to be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). Several other states
and the IJA-ABA Standards require proof by clear and convincing evidence. See in-
fra note 49.
24. "In order to support a particular disposition, the Department must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the disposition is the least restrictive alternative
appropriate to the needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community."
ALASKA DEL. R. 11(e). "In its disposition order, the court shall order the least re-
strictive alternative disposition.., that addresses the juvenile's needs and protects the
public." Id. R. 23(d); see infra Section V.
25. Compare K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d 708, 710-12 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990), peti-
tion for hearing granted, No. S-3923 (Alaska Aug. 2, 1990) (refusing to expand the
Delinquency Rules by consulting the IJA-ABA Standards on detention of juveniles
pending disposition hearings) with R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)
(adopting the IJA-ABA's "least restrictive alternative" standard for dispositions).
K.L.F shows that the Alaska Court of Appeals will no longer consult the IJA-ABA
Standards when there is a court rule directly addressing the issue before it. See infra
notes 100-02 and accompanying text. In a recent case, Perotti v. State, No. 1104, slip
op. (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1991), the court noted that the adoption of the IJA-ABA
Standards, even when there is no rule directly on point, "is a question best suited for
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by the United States Department of Justice show that Alaska institu-
tionalizes delinquent children more often than nearly any other
state.26
Several states have enacted legislation that automatically waives
juvenile jurisdiction when older children commit serious crimes.27
The Alaska Legislature is currently considering a similar bill. 28 Many
factors militate against the passage of such legislation, however, in-
cluding recent funding for secure juvenile treatment units, the lack of
separate facilities for children and youthful offenders in the adult cor-
rectional system, and the tendency of courts to allow waiver of juve-
nile jurisdiction liberally when serious crimes have been committed. 29
It might, however, be beneficial to enact legislation providing for
some proportionality in juvenile delinquency dispositions. Despite all
the procedural protections available to juveniles before the disposition
or "sentencing" phase of the case, the basic choices available to Alaska
juvenile courts are probation or a two-year institutional order.30 The
consideration in the context of the Alaska Supreme Court's rule-making authority.
." Id. at 12 n.2.
26. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFFICE OF Juv. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, JU-
VENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 6 (Oct. 1988). According to these statistics, Alaska's "ju-
venile custody rate" (the number of children in custody per 100,000 children) was the
fourth highest in the country in 1985 and the fifth highest in 1987. Only the District
of Columbia, California, Nevada and South Dakota have higher custody rates.
Alaska's custody rate is two to three times that of most northeastern states. These
statistics are quite shocking if one assumes that institutionalization is not a particu-
larly good solution to the delinquency problem. In terms of the actual number of
children admitted to juvenile institutions, Alaska admitted more than twice as many
children as more populous western states such as Idaho, Montana and Wyoming.
27. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(c) (West 1984) (statutory pre-
sumption that a juvenile court is not an appropriate forum for a juvenile over 16 who
commits certain listed serious felonies); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-805 to 806 (Supp.
1990) (direct filing in district court for juveniles 14 or over where a Class 1 felony is
charged; transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile court to district court allowed if juvenile
court finds that it is contrary to best interests of the child or the public for it to retain
jurisdiction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 938 (1975 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory waiver
for certain listed serious felonies; discretionary waiver for children aged 14-16 for less
serious offenses); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 301.1-385.2 (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1991)
and N.Y. CRIM. PRO. §§ 720.10-725.20 (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1991) (complex statu-
tory scheme that eliminates discretionary waiver by treating children as "designated
felony act" offenders in Family Court (13-15 year-olds) or "youthful offenders" in
adult criminal court (16-19 year-olds)).
28. Alaska H.R. 101, 17th Leg., 1st Sess. (1991). This bill would allow automatic
waiver of jurisdiction for juveniles over age 14 who commit certain serious offenses
unless the juvenile can bear the burden of proving his or her amenability to treatment.
Id.
29. See infra Section III.
30. See infra Section V.
[Vol. 8:1
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY LAW
IJA-ABA Standards recommend a series of dispositions directly re-
lated to the seriousness of the offense.31 The Washington Legislature
has enacted a juvenile code that bases punishment on the seriousness
of the offense.32 The Alaska Legislature has enacted a strict presump-
tive sentencing scheme for adult offenders in which courts are given
only limited discretion in sentencing.33 Although juvenile courts
should be given more discretion in choosing dispositions for delin-
quents than criminal courts are given in sentencing adults, punishment
for juvenile offenses should, in some measure, fit the crime.34
III. JURISDICTION AND WAIVER OF JURISDICTION
In Alaska, a child may be found a "delinquent minor" if he or she
violates a state or municipal criminal law.35 As noted above, the state
may petition the court to "waive" juvenile jurisdiction, however, and
transfer the case to superior or district court for regular adult criminal
proceedings if the child cannot be treated and rehabilitated in the juve-
nile system.36 This section will address two issues: jurisdictional age
limits, and the serious and controversial topic of waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction.
Juvenile jurisdiction is reserved for children under eighteen years
of age on the date of the offense.37 If a person commits an offense
shortly before his or her eighteenth birthday, he or she will be subject
31. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
33. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125-175 (1990); see also Di Pietro, The Development of
Appellate Sentencing Law in Alaska, 7 ALASKA L. REv. 265, 278-95 (1990); infra note
120 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Section V.
35. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(1) (1990). Children can be prosecuted as
adults, however, for violations of traffic, fish and game, and parks and recreation stat-
utes. Id. § 47.10.010(b). As no felony charges are possible under this section, all cases
are in district court. A recent amendment requires the superior court to bring driver's
license revocation actions against juveniles "in the same manner as [against] an
adult." Id. § 47.10.010(d). The statute further provides that a child's parents or
guardian "shall be present at all proceedings" if the case is heard in district court. Id
§ 47.10.010(b). The Alaska Court of Appeals has held the resulting conviction void if
the trial court record does not show "substantial compliance" with the requirement
that the child's parents be present at the criminal proceeding. Aiken v. State, 730
P.2d 821, 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
36. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1990); ALASKA DEL. R. 20(b).
37. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a) (1990). The statute does not set any lower
limit on the age of children who can come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile sys-
tem. Practically speaking, however, very young children who commit offenses are not
charged in the delinquency system, but are generally found to be children in need of
aid. See id. § 47.10.010(a)(2). See generally Melton, supra note 6, at 152-53 (describ-
ing the common law "defense of infancy" for children under age 7 and those between
ages 7 and 14 who fail to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct); Walkover,
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to juvenile jurisdiction even though all of the court proceedings may
occur well after he or she turns eighteen.38 A disposition order can
extend juvenile jurisdiction until the child's nineteenth birthday, or,
with his or her consent, to age twenty.39
The state's ability to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer a
case to adult criminal court is usually reserved for serious criminal
cases involving older children. In order to waive juvenile jurisdiction,
the state must petition the juvenile court prior to an adjudication of
delinquency. 4° If jurisdiction is waived, the child is bound over to su-
perior or district court for trial as an adult.41
Waiver is a two-step process in which the superior court must
find probable cause that the offense has been committed, and that the
child is not amenable to treatment as a juvenile.42 The "probable
cause" portion of a waiver hearing has been termed the "conceptual
equivalent" of a preliminary hearing in an adult criminal case.43 Once
the state has established probable cause, the court must next consider
The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503 (1984) (argu-
ing that the common law defense of infancy should be available to non-culpable chil-
dren under age 14).
38. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837, 841-42 (Alaska 1972). The age limit applies even
to children on juvenile court probation. If a child over 18 commits an offense while on
juvenile probation, he or she will be treated as an adult even though he or she is
technically still within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because of probation.
Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Alaska 1978).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b)(2)(A),(B); (b)(3)(A),(B) (1990).
40. Id. § 47.10.060 (1990); ALASKA DEL. R. 20(b). If the child is actually adjudi-
cated a delinquent, the prosecution cannot thereafter proceed in adult criminal court
without violating the child's double jeopardy rights. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541
(1975). A minor child can file a petition for waiver on his or her own behalf, but is not
entitled to waiver as a matter of right. M.O.W. v. State, 645 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1982). In a recent case, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that, on the
grounds of an "appearance of partiality," a superior court judge who presided over a
waiver hearing should not have presided over the proceedings in adult criminal court.
Perotti v. State, No. 1104, slip op. at 8-13 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1991). The court
noted, however, that the IJA-ABA Standards recommend that a child should be given
an automatic right to challenge the judge who presides over the waiver hearing. Id. at
10-12. The court requested that the Alaska Supreme Court refer to the appropriate
rules committee the issue of whether this standard should be adopted. The court fi-
nally noted that a child arguably has an automatic peremptory challenge to the judge
through Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(d) since the juvenile case is "closed"
after juvenile jurisdiction is waived. Id. at 12 n.2; see also ALASKA DEL. R. 20(d)(2).
41. ALASKA DEL. R. 20(d)(2). The child can be held in custody pending the
transfer. Id. R. 20(e).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(a) (1990); ALASKA DEL. R. 20(d)(1).
43. A.D. v. State, 668 P.2d 840, 841 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); see also ALASKA
R. CRIM. P. 5.1 (governing preliminary examinations). Although the waiver statute
requires only probable cause to believe that the child is "delinquent," the Alaska
Court of Appeals has held that the court must find probable cause that the child
committed the acts charged in the waiver petition. The mere fact that the child is on
[Vol. 8:1
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whether the child is amenable to treatment as a juvenile.44 This issue
has long been one of the most controversial areas in juvenile delin-
quency law in Alaska45 and elsewhere.46 In waiver cases involving
serious crimes, Alaska courts have downplayed their usual concern for
the due process rights of juveniles.47 In these cases, the courts appear
more concerned with punishment and isolation than either the benevo-
lent parens patriae or due process ideal would suggest.
A striking example of the lack of emphasis given to due process
concerns is the burden of proof Alaska courts apply in waiver hear-
ings. In W.M.F v. State,48 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that the
state need show the juvenile's lack of amenability to treatment by only
a preponderance of the evidence. The court first stated that the pre-
ponderance of evidence standard had been adopted in an earlier
Alaska Supreme Court case and was therefore binding on the Alaska
Court of Appeals.49 The court did not find that earlier case control-
ling on the issue of whether the due process clauses of the Alaska or
probation, and therefore "delinquent," does not satisfy the probable cause require-
ment. A.D. v. State, 668 P.2d at 841 n.2; see also ALASKA DEL. R. 20(d)(1)(A)
("probable cause [exists] to believe the juvenile committed the act for which waiver is
sought"). The court also held that probable cause cannot be based solely on hearsay
evidence. A.D. v. State, 668 P.2d at 841 (citing P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837, 842-43
(Alaska 1972)). See generally ALASKA DEL. R. 20(c) (conduct of waiver hearings is
governed by ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)-(e)).
44. A child will normally consent to treatment until age twenty prior to the
waiver hearing. This consent is binding on the child. State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12, 14-
15 (Alaska 1980). The waiver statute now specifically provides that a child's amena-
bility to treatment is to be decided by determining whether or not the child can be
rehabilitated before reaching twenty years of age. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(d)
(1990); cf. ALASKA DEL. R. 20 (governing waiver proceedings).
45. See Note, An Analysis of the Jurisdictional Waiver Procedure in the Juvenile
Courts, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 152 (1975) (discussing procedures and policies un-
derlying waiver of juvenile jurisdiction in Alaska).
46. See C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, supra note 1, at 43-47 (discussing different
states' approaches to determining scope of juvenile court jurisdiction). The IJA-ABA
Standards would allow waiver only for 15, 16 and 17 year-olds charged with very
serious offenses. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR AS'N, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS § 2.1, at 27 (1980).
47. Alaska, of course, complies with the minimum procedural guarantees of fed-
eral due process set out in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966), including
notice, a hearing, representation by counsel and a statement of reasons if waiver is
ordered. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837, 842 (Alaska 1972); see also ALASKA DEL. R. 11,
16, 20 (adopting the Kent requirements).
48. 723 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). W.MF. involved a 14 year-old girl
and 19 year-old man charged with robbing and murdering three elderly Anchorage
residents. Id. at 1299. Justice Daniel A. Moore of the Alaska Supreme Court, sitting
by assignment as a court of appeals judge, wrote the opinion of the court.
49. Id. at 1300 (citing In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978)). The FS. opinion
is somewhat suspect. F.S. was overruled on other grounds by State v. F.L.A., 608
P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980), and the standard of proof issue did not appear to be well
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United States Constitutions required more than the preponderance
standard, but concluded that neither constitution prohibited a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, and thus upheld it in this context.50
W.MF. is interesting for several reasons. First, by adopting a
preponderance rather than a clear and convincing standard, it shows
the court's refusal to emphasize procedural protections and due pro-
cess in waiver cases involving serious offenses.5 1 Second, it shows the
willingness of Alaska courts to adopt rules for juvenile proceedings
briefed by the parties. The FS. court relied on its "independent research" to arrive at
the conclusion that a preponderance standard was "uniform" in other jurisdictions.
In re F.S., 586 P.2d at 611. It also appears that the court did not have to decide the
issue because it found that any error the superior court made in applying the clear and
convincing standard was harmless. Id. at 612.
Contrary to the F.S. court's assertion, the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard in waiver hearings is not "uniform" in other jurisdictions. A significant minority
of states have adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard for waiver. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. King, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 605, 460 N.E.2d 1299, 1302 (1984);
In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 436-37, 664 P.2d 947, 953 (1983) (both cases stating
a "clear and convincing" evidence standard); see also In re White, 227 Kan. 881, 886-
87, 610 P.2d 1114, 1118-19 (1980); K.C.H. v. State, 674 P.2d 551, 552 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1984) (both cases stating a "substantial evidence" requirement). Perhaps be-
cause of the problems with FS. and the strength of these decisions from other states,
children have continued to challenge, albeit unsuccessfully, the application of the pre-
ponderance of evidence standard. See M.K. v. State, 744 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1987); D.E.P. v. State, 727 P.2d 800, 802 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); C.G.C. v.
State, 702 P.2d 648, 649 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
The IJA-ABA Standards recommend a clear and convincing burden of proof.
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS § 2.2C Commentary at 44 (1980). In any event,
the preponderance of the evidence standard is now required by rule in Alaska.
ALASKA DEL. R. 11(c).
50. W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1301.
51. The waiver statute provides that a child is "unamenable to treatment" if he or
she "probably cannot be rehabilitated.., before reaching 20 years of age." ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.060(d) (1990) (emphasis added). Although the F.S. opinion found that
"probably" connoted a preponderance of the evidence standard, it also could be
viewed as imposing a higher standard in determining that a juvenile is not amenable to
treatment. Instead of attempting to resolve this ambiguity in the waiver statute, the
court in W.M.F viewed FS. as binding precedent for the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1300. The court chose not look at the
waiver statute as a penal statute to be construed strictly against the government. Id.;
see Romero v. State, 792 P.2d 679, 682 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) ("It is well settled that
a penal statute must be construed strictly and that ambiguities must be resolved
against the stale.").
After adopting the preponderance standard, the W.M.F court proceeded to ex-
amine only whether that standard provided sufficient procedural due process protec-
tion to the juvenile. The court used the due process test stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). W.M.F. v. State,
723 P.2d at 1300. Although Alaska courts have often concluded the Alaska Constitu-
tion's due process clause provides greater protections than federal due process, see,
e.g., Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 674-76 (Alaska 1990),
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without deferring to the legislature.5 2 Although in this instance the
court used its rule-making authority to provide less due process pro-
tection to juveniles, it appears that this tendency is confined to waiver
cases. In most other areas of delinquency law, court decisions provide
more rather than less protection for children subject to juvenile
jurisdiction. 53
The waiver statute sets out the factors courts must address in de-
ciding a juvenile's amenability to treatment: the seriousness of the of-
fense; the history of delinquency; the probable cause of the minor's
delinquent behavior; and the facilities available for treatment in the
juvenile systenh. 54 Although psychological examinations are not re-
quired,55 most decisions rely on expert opinions concerning amenabil-
ity to treatment.56 In a recent case, R.H. v. State,57 the court held that
a child could not be compelled to undergo a psychological examina-
tion to determine amenability unless the child introduced psychologi-
cal evidence in his or her own behalf.58 The superior court has broad
the W.M.F court did not consider providing greater protections under the Alaska
Constitution to children faced with waiver. W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1300.
52. The W.MF. and F.S. courts did not see their role as merely interpreting the
language of the waiver statute, but as having broad authority to set rules for juvenile
proceedings, even where those rules bordered on substantive rather than procedural
matters. The Alaska Supreme Court has routinely held that it has broad, "inherent"
rule-making authority. See Surina v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981); Noland
v. Sea Airmotive, 627 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1981).
53. See infra Sections IV, V. Alaska courts have noted the high stakes involved in
waiver cases. See R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d 204, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). For the
child involved in a homicide case, the waiver decision may mean the difference be-
tween a few years in a juvenile institution and up to 99 years in an adult jail. For the
family of the victim, conversely, allowing the child a relatively short stay in a juvenile
institution may seem entirely unjust. In allocating the burden of proof at waiver hear-
ings as they have, perhaps the Alaska courts have seen their role more from the per-
spective of protection of the public than rehabilitation of the child.
54. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1990).
55. J.R. v. State, 616 P.2d 865, 867 (Alaska 1980).
56. See, e.g., State v. J.D.S., 723 P.2d 1278, 1280-81 (Alaska 1986) (juvenile
court's Memorandum of Decision Denying Waiver discussing psychiatric evidence of-
fered at hearing); In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 614 n.26 (Alaska 1978) (juvenile court
heard extensive psychiatric testimony as to amenability); In re J.H.B., 578 P.2d 146,
149 (Alaska 1978) (same); D.E.P. v. State, 727 P.2d 800, 801 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)
(court notes that six mental health professionals testified at waiver hearing); C.G.C. v.
State, 702 P.2d 648, 649 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (discussing psychiatric evidence
heard by juvenile court).
57. 777 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
58. Id. at 211; see also Perotti v. State, No. 1104, slip op. at 3 (Alaska Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 1991) (R.H. rule violated by court-ordered psychological evaluation). The
R.H. court relied extensively on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465-74 (1981), in
which the United States Supreme Court held that results of a court-ordered pretrial
psychological competency examination could not be used at the defendant's sentenc-
ing hearing. R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d at 209-13. The Alaska Court of Appeals held
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discretion in weighing the statutory factors and can disregard the con-
sensus of psychological experts if it wishes.5 9
It appears that the primary factor in deciding waiver cases, how-
ever, is the seriousness of the offense. A prime example of the weight
given this factor is the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in State v.
J.D.S.,6° which involved the robbery and murder of a convenience
store clerk. The superior court found that J.D.S., who was only four-
teen at the time of the offense, had "not yet begun to mature" and had
"the appearance of an 11 year-old. ' 61 The court went on to find that
he did not have much potential for rehabilitation, but that he was
much more likely to be rehabilitated through confinerfent in a secure
juvenile facility than an adult facility. 62 In choosing to deny waiver,
the court also noted that appropriate treatment was not available in
the adult correctional system.63
that a waiver hearing is clearly an adversarial proceeding in which the consequences
are extremely serious, and therefore the juvenile retains his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 210, 212. Even with the elaborate safeguards imple-
mented by the trial court, the court found that a compelled examination violated self-
incrimination guarantees. Id. at 207, 210; see U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 9.
The R.H. decision raises the interesting issue of what happens if the child decides
to present psychological evidence and is compelled to undergo a psychological exami-
nation, but loses the waiver hearing and goes to trial in adult criminal court. At trial,
the question of whether or not the state can use the statements given by the child in
the compelled examination arises. It appears that at least some sort of "use immu-
nity" is necessary in this situation to avoid making the child choose between vigor-
ously defending against waiver and asserting his or her right against self-incrimination
at trial. See Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 810, 693 P.2d 789, 795,
210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 210 (1985) ("We hold the California Constitution to require that
testimony a minor gives at a fitness hearing... may not be used against him at a
subsequent trial of the offense."); Whitebread & Heilman, supra note 1, at 295 ("In
many states, evidence presented by the juvenile at a waiver hearing is not admissible
against the juvenile in a subsequent adjudicatory hearing or criminal prosecution.
Thus the juvenile can admit the charge at the waiver hearing in order to demonstrate
amenability to rehabilitation under the juvenile court system and subsequently contest
the petition or complaint.") (citation omitted). The IJA-ABA Standards recommend
immunity if the child wishes to present evidence on amenability and note that many
states offer some sort of protection to a child in this situation. INSTITUTE OF JUDI-
CIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BE-
TWEEN COURTS § 2.31, commentary at 50-51 (1980).
59. R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d at 211; see also Dolchok v. State, 639 P.2d 277, 281
(Alaska 1982) (absent clear error, trial court was free to disregard uniform psychologi-
cal evidence and refuse to find the defendant not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect).
60. 723 P.2d 1278 (Alaska 1986).
61. Id. at 1281.
62. Id. at 1279, 1281.
63. Id. at 1281.
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On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court's majority opinion focused
on this last finding by the superior court, and held that it was an error
of law to base an amenability to treatment decision on a comparison
between the rehabilitative alternatives available in the adult and juve-
nile systems.64 Although the normal course would have been to re-
mand the case to the trial court for findings under the legally correct
factors, the supreme court simply ordered the child waived to adult
court.65 Justice Rabinowitz, joined by Justice Compton, dissented.
They would have remanded the case to the trial court to enter unam-
biguous findings without considering the treatment the child would
have received in the adult correctional system.66
From these appellate court decisions, it appears that the commis-
sion of a serious offense often outweighs a child's youth or lack of
prior delinquency adjudications in a court's waiver decision. 67 Given
the appellate courts' tendency to uphold waiver decisions in cases in-
volving serious felony offenses, it is unlikely that the Alaska Legisla-
ture would see a need to follow the course taken by several other states
in enacting legislation making waiver mandatory when such offenses
are committed by older children. 68 The courts' approval of the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard makes proving that a juvenile is
not amenable to treatment relatively easy for the state. The legislature
has recently appropriated considerable amounts of money to renovate
64. Id. at 1279. In finding that an error of law was made, the supreme court
avoided the "abuse of discretion" standard of review usually applied in waiver cases.
See D.E.P. v. State, 727 P.2d 800, 802 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); W.M.F. v. State, 723
P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); C.G.C. v. State, 702 P.2d 648, 651
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
65. The trial court's "Memorandum of Decision Denying Waiver" was ambigu-
ous as to the grounds upon which the finding of amenability was based. State v.
J.D.S., 723 P.2d at 1279 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). Where a trial court's factual
findings are incorrect or ambiguous, an appellate court usually remands the case for
reconsideration. It is interesting to note that then-Chief Justice Matthews, the author
of the J.D.S. opinion, had dissented in two prominent criminal cases because he
thought the cases should be remanded for further evidentiary hearings instead of sim-
ply being reversed. Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 367 (Alaska 1983) (Matthews, J.,
dissenting in part); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 742-43 (Alaska 1979) (Boochever,
C.J., and Matthews, J., dissenting). It almost appears as if the majority simply did not
want the J.D.S. case remanded to the trial court so as to allow another opportunity to
avoid waiver.
66. State v. J.D.S., 723 P.2d at 1279-81 (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Compton, J.,
dissenting).
67. See, eg., State v. J.D.S., 723 P.2d 1278 (Alaska 1986) (waiver of 14 year-old
charged with murder); D.E.P v. State, 727 P.2d 800 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (waiver of
16 year-old charged with sexual assault and burglary); W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (waiver of 14 year-old charged with murder); C.G.C. v. State,
702 P.2d 648 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (waiver of 15 year-old charged with murder).
68. See supra note 27.
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and construct secure juvenile treatment facilities. 69 Furthermore, the
Department of Corrections, which controls detention and incarcera-
tion facilities for adults, does not maintain separate facilities for youth-
ful offenders. 70 It seems unlikely that the legislature would reverse
course given the amounts already invested in juvenile facilities, and the
amounts that might be needed to fund adult corrections were there an
influx of juveniles into the adult system. Finally, the passage of
mandatory waiver statutes is less likely in light of the difficulties other
states have had in implementing presumptive waiver.71
IV. ADJUDICATION AND DETENTION
Once a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
the child is axraigned and must either admit or deny the state's allega-
tions.72 If he or she admits the petition, the court will set the case for
69. In 1986, a youth facility was constructed in Bethel at the cost of $3,600,000.
The Closed Treatment Unit at McLaughlin Youth Center was renovated in 1988 at
the cost of $2,COO,000. A new co-ed unit was added to the Fairbanks Youth Facility
in 1987, and a new facility was opened in Nome in 1982. The legislative authorization
for operating the state's five youth facilities exceeded $12,800,000 for fiscal year 1991.
Memorandum from Robert Buttcane, Probation Supervisor, Alaska Division of Fam-
ily and Youth Services, Youth Corrections, to Blair McCune, Jan. 31, 1991 (reflecting
information provided by Mr. Richard Illias, Youth Corrections Administrator) (on
file with Alaska Law Review).
70. The lack of appropriate facilities in the adult system was one of the reasons
the trial court did not order waiver in J.D.S. State v. J.D.S., 723 P.2d 1278, 1281
(Alaska 1986).
71. See C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, supra note 1, at 44-46; Champion, Teenage
Felons and Waiver Hearings: Some Recent Trends 1980-1988, 35 CRIME AND DELINQ.
577 (1989); Note, Rehabilitation v. Punishment: A Comparative Analysis of the Juvenile
Justice Systems in Massachusetts and New York, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1091, 1107-
21 (1987) (describing the New York Juvenile Offender Act and the repercussions of
treating serious juvenile offenders presumptively as adults).
72. ALASKA DEL. R. 14(b). Most of the procedures in juvenile delinquency cases
are set forth in the court rules. A few provisions in the Alaska Statutes set out proce-
dures to be followed after a petition is filed in superior court. The statutes provide
that a petition may be filed, ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020(b) (1990); an attorney or
guardian ad litem may be appointed, id. § 47.10.050; the child may be released or
detained, id. § 47.10.040; informal hearings may be held that do not deny a child's
right to a public trial and a trial by jury, id. § 47.10.070; and, if the child is found to be
a delinquent minor, disposition orders may be entered by the court. Id.
§ 47.10.080(b). The rules do not provide expressly for "no contest" pleas in delin-
quency cases, see ALASKA DEL. R. 2, 17 (describing "admit" and "deny" pleas), but,
in the author's experience, such pleas are often allowed by juvenile court judges and
masters under the inherent powers of the court.
All juvenile court proceedings are held in superior court. The superior court can
appoint masters to preside over certain types ofjuvenile hearings. ALASKA DEL. R. 4.
The master's findings must be reviewed by the superior court. Id. R. 4(b)(3), R. 4(f);
see ALASKA R. Civ. P. 53(d) (governing master's reports). Any party may file objec-
tions to the findings and ask for a hearing de novo. ALASKA DEL. R. 4(f)(1). The
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disposition.73 If the child denies the allegations, however, the case
will set for an adjudication hearing, which is a trial on the merits of
the petition.74
Before going to an adjudication hearing, however, the case may
be informally "diverted" at the discretion of the juvenile intake of-
ficer.75 Pre-trial "diversion" allows an offender to go through an in-
formal, probation-type program rather than going to court. If the
child is a first-time offender, the offense is not serious, or if it seems
that the child's problems can be taken care of by family or community
resources, the charges can be held in abeyance pending completion of
an informal probationary program. Such a program would typically
include regular school or work attendance, curfew, supervision by a
parent or other responsible adult, and participation in a counseling or
substance abuse program.76
The leading Alaska case establishing childrens' procedural rights
in the adjudication process is R.L.R. v. State.77 The court held for the
first time that the statute in effect at the time, which provided that all
juvenile hearings were to be held without a jury,78 violated the Alaska
constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury.79 The court noted
that although a number of courts in other states had upheld denials of
jury trials in juvenile cases, the Alaska Constitution guaranteed such a
superior court is not bound by the master's recommendations, but the master's find-
ings of fact should be accepted if they are not "clearly erroneous." ALASKA R. Civ.
P. 53(d)(2); see also Matter of B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 381 (Alaska 1986) (citing
Headlough v. Headlough, 639 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Alaska 1982)). In Anchorage, juve-
nile delinquency cases are routinely assigned to a standing master of the superior
court. In many other areas of the state, most notably Fairbanks, superior court
judges, rather than masters, usually preside over all delinquency hearings.
73. ALASKA DEL. R. 14; For a discussion of disposition proceedings, see infra
Section V.
74. ALASKA DEL. R. 21.
75. Id. R. 6(d). There has been some controversy among experts in the juvenile
justice field about diversion. Many experts believe that diversion programs often do
more harm than good because children who would not normally be subject to supervi-
sion by the delinquency system are ensnared by diversion programs. Children who
were formerly given a warning by a local policeman and whose problems were han-
dled by his or her family or school are now processed through the delinquency system.
This phenomenon is referred to as "net-widening." See C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER,
supra note 1, at 134-36.
76. Diversion, or "informal supervision" as it is called in the rule, cannot last
more than six months. ALASKA DEL. R. 6(d). No detention or out of home placement
is permitted. If the child does not successfully complete informal supervision, a peti-
tion for adjudication may be filed. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020(a) (1990)
(allowing "informal adjustment" prior to a petition being filed).
77. 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
78. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1966) amended by Act effective Aug. 16, 1972,
ch. 71, § 53, 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws 11.
79. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 33 n.35, 35; see ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
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right.80 The court also held that juveniles have a right to a public trial
and to be present at all proceedings, and that process must be person-
ally served on the juvenile.8' The prosecution's burden of proof is the
same as in adult criminal trials: the state must prove charges beyond a
reasonable doubt.8 2 The Alaska Supreme Court has also held that the
constitutional right to a speedy trial applies to juvenile proceedings,
but has not strictly applied the 120 day period applicable to adult
cases.
83
80. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 35. The court also held that the right to a jury
trial was not self-executing, but was available only if the child "affirmatively as-
sert[ed]" the right. A child can waive jury trial with consultation of counsel or, where
appropriate, a guardian ad litem. Id. at 32-35. The delinquency rules now provide for
a jury of 12 persons if the child submits a request within 10 days after arraignment.
ALASKA DEL. R. 21(a),(b).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment does not
require a trial by jury in juvenile cases. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971). Nevertheless, a juvenile's right to a jury trial under the Alaska Constitution
was an open question at the time R.L.R. was decided. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 31
(citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1967)). See generally Melton, supra note 6, at
174-75 (advocating jury trials in juvenile cases).
81. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 38-43. The Delinquency Rules currently provide
that a trial in juvenile court is "not open to the public" unless the child requests a
public trial. ALASKA DEL. R. 21(a). The R.L.R. court held that a guardian ad litem
could be appointed to provide independent judgment where public proceedings ap-
peared to be against the child's best interests, but the child still insisted on them.
R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 39.
It should also be noted that records of juvenile court proceedings are supposed to
be kept strictly confidential. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090(a) (1990); see also ALASKA
DEL. R. 27 (governing the confidentiality of juvenile court records). It is a misde-
meanor to violate the confidentiality of children's proceedings. ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.090(c) (1990). One of the few criminal cases in which the United States
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Alaska Supreme Court occurred as a result
of the Alaska court's solicitude toward the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. In
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Court held that the trial court's refusal to
allow the state to impeach a juvenile witness on his delinquency record violated the
confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 315-21; U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. As a result of Davis and other cases, Alaska courts now allow more liberal
access to childrens' court records for cross-examination purposes. See, e.g., Sledge v.
State, 763 P.2d 1364, 1367-69 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Both the Alaska courts and legislature have also been willing to allow victims of
juvenile offenses access to delinquency proceedings. See W.M.F. v. Johnstone, 711
P.2d 1187, 1190 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.072 (1990); ALASKA
DEL. R. 3(c).
82. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 46 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970)
(federal due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency adjudi-
cations)). The R.L.R. court did not reach the standard of proof issue, but did note
Winship and noted that the Delinquency Rules had been amended to provide for a
reasonable doubt standard. Id.; see ALASKA DEL. R. 1 l(b).
83. R.D.S.M. v. Intake Officer, 565 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1977); see U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45 (providing for 120
day speedy trial period). Although Rule 45 was considered a "valuable guide" in
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The R.L.R. case, however, is perhaps as interesting for its ration-
ale as for the decision itself. Justice Rabinowitz's opinion states that
the "benevolent social theory" of protecting juveniles, that is, the
parenspatriae theory, which is often used as a justification for limiting
due process rights, could not justify deprivation of rights guaranteed
by the Alaska Constitution.84 The court found no empirical basis for
concluding that the special features of juvenile courts led to less recidi-
vism than "ordinary adult criminal proceedings."85 The majority also
noted that earlier juvenile court cases often showed "much more ex-
tensive and fundamental error than is generally found in adult crimi-
nal cases."'8 6 As a result, in R.L.R., the Alaska court put itself
squarely behind the due process, as opposed to the parens patriae,
theory.87
Along with most other courts, Alaska courts have held that evi-
dence illegally seized by the police cannot be used in adjudication pro-
ceedings, 8s but that the admission of evidence discovered in searches
by non-state actors is constitutionally permissible under many circum-
stances.89 A number of Alaska cases deal with children's rights
determining whether one's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, it was
not held to be directly applicable in a juvenile proceeding. R.D.S.M. v. Intake Officer,
565 P.2d at 858 and n.13.
84. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 30-31.
85. Id. There is still no empirical evidence that informal proceedings with less
emphasis on due process rights are more effective in reducing juvenile crime or reha-
bilitating juvenile offenders than more formal proceedings. See C. SHIREMAN & F.
REAMER, supra note 1, at 31-36; see also Melton, supra note 6, at 164-66 (arguing that
more formal procedures can have positive rehabilitative effects for delinquent adoles-
cents). After much study, the committee that formulated the IJA-ABA Standards
came to believe that a delinquency system providing comprehensive due process rights
and determinate dispositions could better serve these goals than formal proceedings.
C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, supra note 1, at 125. It should be noted, however, that
even the most stringent due process guarantees cannot ensure fair treatment at dispo-
sition. Id. at 32, 38-42. This fact is apparent in Alaska, where large numbers of
juveniles are confined to institutions despite strong due process guarantees. See supra
note 26.
86. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d at 38 (citing In re G.M.B., 483 P.2d 1006 (Alaska
1971) and E.J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367 (Alaska 1970) (two earlier cases involving deten-
tion of children without a hearing)).
87. See supra Section III.
88. See, eg., J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170, 173-78 (Alaska 1975) (implicit in
court's discussion of whether evidence seized by foster parent was inadmissible on
state or federal constitutional grounds); D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982) (implicit in court's extensive discussion of whether evidence acquired by
school officials in a locker search was admissible in juvenile adjudication).
89. J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d at 176-77. J.M.A. involved the admission of evi-
dence found in a search by a foster parent. The Alaska Court of Appeals had also
held that searches by school officials fell into this constitutionally permissible cate-
gory. D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d at 256. This is no longer the case, however, given the
decision of the United States Supreme Court that school officials act as representatives
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against self-incrimination. Generally speaking, these rights are coex-
tensive with the fifth amendment rights of adults in criminal cases,
although confessions are more likely to be held involuntary if a child is
not afforded an opportunity during custodial interrogation 9 to have
his or her parent or guardian present. 91 Nevertheless, a juvenile is not
per se incapable of waiving his or her Miranda rights.92
In the area of pre-adjudication detention of juveniles, the current
rules and statutes provide that a child has a right to a hearing prior to
or soon after detention.93 To detain a child, the state must show both
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense was committed
and that detention is necessary to protect the juvenile or the public, or
to ensure the child's appearance at subsequent court hearings.94
of the state when carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions, and thus are
not entitled to immunity from the fourth amendment. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 336-37 (1985); see also Lowry v. State, 707 P.2d 280, 285-86 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982).
90. Custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d at 172 n.1 (quot-
ing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
91. See S.B. v. State, 614 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1980) (parent present). The Alaska
Court of Appeals recently held that a juvenile's confession must be suppressed if the
police fail to notify his or her parents immediately, as required under Alaska Delin-
quency Rule 7(b). In re J.R.N., No. A-3529 (Alaska Ct. App. April; 12, 1991).
Courts in several states have established a "parental notification" exclusionary rule,
often based on a statute or rule requiring notification. Under these rules, a child's
statements to police must be suppressed if substantial and timely efforts to notify the
child's parents are not undertaken prior to questioning. See, e.g., People v. Castro,
118 Misc. 2d 868, 462 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1983); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911 (Wyo.
1984). It remains to be seen whether the Alaska courts will interpret the parental
notification requirement of Delinquency Rule 7(d) as a basis for exclusion of a confes-
sion absent substantial compliance, or whether failure to notify a parent will be just
one factor to be considered in determining whether a juvenile's confession is voluntary
under the circumstances. See Ridgely v. State, 705 P.2d 924, 932 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985) (per curiam) rev'd, 732 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1987); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 716-24 (1979) (continued interrogation by police after juvenile requested to
see his probation officer in response to Miranda warnings did not result in a violation
of his fifth amendment rights). In Fare, the Court "assumed without deciding" that
Miranda was fully applicable to juvenile proceedings. 442 U.S. at 717 n.4; see J.M.A.
v. State, 542 P.2d at 172 n. I ("There is no question but that juveniles are also entitled
to the warnings required by Miranda.")
92. Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719 (Alaska 1979); see also Melton, supra note 6,
at 170-74 (reviewing literature on the validity of childrens' waiver of Miranda rights).
93. ALASKA DEL. R. 12(a); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.040, 47.10.140 (1990). The
Alaska Legislature has recently enacted a statute that allows police to take runaway or
missing minors into protective custody. Id. § 47.10.141.
94. ALASKA DEL. R. 12(b); see K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d 708, 711 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1990), petition for hearing granted, No. S-3923 (Alaska July 30, 1990).
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Though detention is usually equated with placement in a locked, se-
cure setting, the state must also make these showings in order to place
a child in a group home or shelter.95
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized substantial procedural
fights for juveniles at detention hearings.9 6 Although the court has
rejected the argument that a child has the same right to bail as an
adult under the Alaska Constitution, 97 it has found that a child has
"the right to remain free" pending adjudication. 98 The child's right to
remain free incorporates the "least restrictive alternative" to pre-adju-
dication detention requirement now specifically mentioned in the de-
linquency rules.99
The Alaska Court of Appeals recently decided that a child may
be detained solely on the basis of the risk that he or she may fail to
appear at future court proceedings. 10° The child in K.L.F v. State
argued that the court should use the IJA-ABA Standards for "gui-
dance" in interpreting the Delinquency Rules.101 Although the child
was not a danger to herself or others, and had committed only a minor
offense, the court noted that she had an extensive history of running
95. ALASKA DEL. R. 12(b)(1)-(2).
96. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (1971). The court held that inadmissible hearsay
evidence could not be used as a basis for detention. Detention must be based on
"competent, sworn testimony." Id. at 53. The court also held that a child had a right
to counsel at a detention hearing and that the detention order had to be supported by
particular facts. Id.
97. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
98. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d at 52. The court described this right as follows:
If the facts produced at the inquiry show that the child cannot return or
remain at home, every effort must be made to place the child in a situation
where his freedom will not be curtailed. Only if there is clearly no alterna-
tive available may the child be committed to a detention facility and de-
prived of his freedom.
Id. at 53.
99. ALASKA! DEL. R. 12(b)(2). The least restrictive alternative approach is also
incorporated in the IJA-ABA Standards. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERI-
CAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS, §§ 3.1-3.6 (1980). On
the other hand, other states' more restrictive approaches to pre-adjudication release
have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253 (1984), the Court upheld a New York statute that allowed preventive detention of
juveniles despite a finding by the New York Court of Appeals (New York's highest
court) that pre-trial detention was actually being used as a punitive measure in New
York and other states. Id. at 271-72. See Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Transfor-
mation of Judicial Precedent, 31 B.C.L. REv. 641 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme
Court distorted precedent to decide Schall and that the Court has used Schall to dis-
tort other constitutional doctrines).
100. K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d 708, 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990),petition for hearing
granted, No. S-3923 (Alaska July 30, 1990).
101. Id. at 710. The IJA-ABA Standards would not allow detention unless a crime
of violence was charged and other factors were met. Id. at 709 n.2; see supra note 99.
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away from placements, and held that the plain language of Delin-
quency Rule 12 gave the superior court discretion to detain her solely
to ensure her appearance at subsequent court hearings. 10 2 The Alaska
Supreme Court has granted discretionary review, but has not yet de-
cided this case. The supreme court is expected to weigh the possibility
of harm that could result from such detention against the need for
juvenile courts to ensure that children appear for court dates. The
child is arguing that the court should apply the relevant IJA-ABA
Standards to the pre-adjudication detention decision, thus requiring
release under the facts of her case.103
In comparing the cases and rules on adjudication and detention
with the cases on waiver of jurisdiction, one cannot help but conclude
that there is a great deal more solicitude toward the due process rights
of children in the adjudication cases than in those on waiver proce-
dures. Most of the due process rights first established in case law have
now been incorporated into the Delinquency Rules, however, and
Alaska courts may not be willing to grant greater due process rights
for children than already exist. The supreme court's ruling in KL.F.
may be an indication of this trend. 10 4
V. DISPOSITION
Once a child has been adjudicated a delinquent minor, the next
step is a disposition hearing at which the superior court must choose
one of the three alternatives for placement available under the Alaska
statutes.10 5 The first, and least restrictive disposition is "supervisory
probation," under which the child is released on probation to a parent
or guardian and is supervised by a juvenile probation officer.' 0 6 The
child remains in the legal custody of the parent or guardian, but will
be subject to conditions of probation, typically including curfews, reg-
ular school or work attendance, and participation in substance abuse
or other treatment programs.
The second alternative is "custodial probation," 'in which the
child is committed to the legal custody of the Department of Health
102. K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d at 712.
103. Brief of Appellant at 11-17, K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d 708 (Alaska Ct. App.
1990), petition for hearing granted, No. S-3923 (Alaska July 30, 1990) (citing INSTI-
TUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO
INTERIM STATUS § 6.6 (1980) (outlining standards for release and detention prior to
adjudication)).
104. K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d 708 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) petition for hearing
granted, No. S-3923 (Alaska July 30, 1990).
105. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b) (1990); see ALASKA DEL. R. 22 (governing the
predisposition report submitted by the Department of Health and Social Services); id.
R. 23 (governing the disposition hearing itself).
106. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b)(2) (1990).
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and Social Services. 107 Although the child may still be released to the
physical custody of a parent or guardian, the Department has author-
ity to place him or her in a more restrictive, but still "nondetention"
setting, such as a group home or foster home.108 The Department has
considerable discretion in placing children who are committed to its
custody.10 9 There are a number of different group homes for children
in Alaska. Some provide intensive supervision and therapy for chil-
dren with serious behavioral or emotional problems, while others are
less restrictive and less therapy oriented. The homes are usually run
by private non-profit organizations, but depend in large part on state
and federal funding. Both children from the delinquency system and
children in need of aid are usually placed in these homes.
107. Id. § 47.10.080(b)(3).
108. Id.
109. In State v. A.C., 682 P.2d 1131 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), the Department of
Health and Social Services appealed the superior court's order placing a child in a
group treatment home rather than in his mother's home as the Department directed.
The Alaska Court of Appeals held that placement decisions were entrusted to the
Department's discretion. Although the juvenile court could "review" the decision
pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 47.10.080(f), it could not substitute its judgment
for the Department's; review was limited to the issue of whether or not the Depart-
ment has abused its discretion. State v. A.C., 682 P.2d at 1134; see also In re B.L.J.,
717 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Alaska 1986) (Department had similar discretion in placing
children in need of aid). A. C. is significant for the fact that it totally ignores the theory
that the superior court has inherent authority over a delinquent child as a "ward of
the court." The case represents a rejection of the personal responsibility juvenile court
judges traditionally professed for their wards and a move toward the "due process"
ideal. The majority decided the case solely on the basis of statutory construction and
legislative intent. State v. A.C., 682 P.2d at 1134-35. Judge Singleton's concurring
opinion cites case law on appeals from decisions entrusted to the discretion of various
administrative agencies. Id. at 1135 (Singleton, J., concurring). Under the parens
patriae theory, a delinquent child would more likely be seen as a ward of the court,
and the court seen as having a responsibility to involve itself directly in the child's
well-being. See A. PLATr, supra note 1, at 137-45; Melton, supra note 6, at 150-53. A
juvenile court judge from the early part of this century might well have been horrified
by Judge Singleton's comparison of the court's administration of children's programs
to the administration by state agencies of energy programs.
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The third placement alternative after an adjudication of delin-
quency 110 is an institutional order, placing the child in a juvenile cor-
rectional home or similar detention facility. I In R.P. v. State,11 2 the
Alaska Court of Appeals held that courts should seek the "least re-
strictive alternatives" when choosing among dispositions.11 3 Specifi-
cally, the court held that juvenile courts should consider and reject
less restrictive alternatives prior to imposing more restrictive alterna-
tives, and that the state had the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that less restrictive alternatives are inappropriate in a
particular case. The factors underlying this decision are the child's
degree of culpability, the circumstances of the case, and the child's age
and prior record of delinquency. 114 The court stressed that rehabilita-
tion was the goal of "paramount importance" in juvenile disposition
decisions.115
The least restrictive alternative approach mandated by R.P. was
incorporated in the Alaska Delinquency Rules,116 which also provide
that the state bears the burdein of proof on this issue.1 17 In another
recent case, the Alaska Court of Appeals reaffirmed these standards,
as well as the factors determining the least restrictive alternative: the
"paramount importance of rehabilitation" and the "strong presump-
tion against institutionalization" outlined in R.P. 118
110. In some cases, children who come before the courts are given a deferred adju-
dication of delinquency. This disposition is conceptually similar to a suspended impo-
sition of sentence in adult criminal cases, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.085 (1990), but,
unlike a suspended sentence, is not specifically allowed by statute. In M.O.W. v.
State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), the court of appeals noted that the
superior court had entered a deferred adjudication, but expressed "no opinion as to
the propriety of deferring an adjudication of delinquency," since that issue was not
before the court. Id. at 1230 n.3. Under the current court rules, an adjudication can
be held in abeyance for up to a year. ALASKA DEL. R. 21(d)(1)(B).
111. ALASKA, STAT. § 47.10.080(b)(1) (1990). There are several such facilities in
the state of Alaska. See supra note 69. Placement out of state, which was apparently
routine at one time for the most serious offenders, is now very rare since high-security
closed treatment units have been constructed in Alaska. See D.H. v. State, 561 P.2d
294, 296 n.2 (Alaska 1977) (describing then-existing juvenile facilities in Alaska).
112. 718 P.2d 168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
113. Id. at 169.
114. Id. at 169-70.
115. Id. at 169 n.1.
116. ALASKA DEL. R. 23(d) (mandates the least restrictive alternative disposition
that addresses juveniles' treatment needs and protects the public).
117. Id. R. 11(e).
118. In re J.H., 758 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (citing R.P. v. State,
718 P.2d 168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)). The Alaska Court of Appeals has recently
decided two cases holding that institutional placement is the least restrictive alterna-
tive in particular circumstances. P.R.J. v. State, 787 P.2d 123, 124 (Alaska Ct. App.
1990) (juvenile's history of running away from less secure settings, substance abuse
and failure to gain admission to other programs justified placement in secure facility);
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Once a child is institutionalized, he or she may be held for an
indeterminate period not to exceed two years, regardless of the crime
charged in the petition. 119 This indeterminate period, of course,
sharply contrasts with the rigid "presumptive" sentencing scheme en-
acted for adults in the 1980 Criminal Code revision.12 0
The IJA-ABA Standards recommend replacing indeterminate ju-
venile dispositions with a "grid" that allows relatively short probation-
ary placements for less severe offenses committed by children without
prior records, and more lengthy and restrictive placements for serious
crimes and second and subsequent offenses. 121 Washington is the only
state which has enacted a disposition statute following the IJA-ABA
Standards.122
R.N. v. State, 770 P.2d 301, 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (juvenile's past and continu-
ing criminal conduct, substance abuse and threat to run away from less secure setting
justified placement in secure juvenile correction facility).
119. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b)(1) (1990). This period may be extended on
motion of the petitioner, or the child may be released on probation to a less restrictive
placement. Id. §§ 47.10.080(b)(1), 47.10.200 (release from commitment permitted in
the Department's discretion if there is a "reasonable probability that the juvenile will
remain at liberty without violating the law"). The superior court has broad authority
to extend disposition orders beyond the initial two year period when in the best inter-
est of the juvenile and the public. P.R.J. v. State, 787 P.2d 123, 125 (Alaska Ct. App.
1990). A child is also entitled to notice and a new disposition hearing if his or her
administrative release from an institution is revoked. L.C. v. State, 625 P.2d 839, 842
(Alaska 1981). The Delinquency Rules set out the standards for juvenile probation
revocation proceedings. ALASKA DEL. R. 24. In A.S. v. State, 761 P.2d 122, 124
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals held that the state could proceed by
probation revocation rather than by a petition for adjudication even if a new juvenile
offense was charged. Under the probation revocation rules, the child is entitled only
to a hearing. ALASKA DEL. R. 24. At an adjudication hearing, however, the child
would have had the right to a jury trial and the state would have borne the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
120. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125-175 (1990). The Alaska Criminal Sentencing
Code provides for three classes of felony and two classes of misdemeanor crimes. The
most serious crimes are "unclassified" offenses. "Presumptive," that is, fixed or
mandatory minimum sentences, generally without the possibility of reduction through
parole or suspended time, are imposed for second or subsequent felonies and for Class
A and unclassified felonies. The goal of the revision was to lessen the discretion for-
merly given to the court, in order to eliminate "unjustified disparity" in sentencing.
Id. § 12.55.005 (1990); see Di Pietro, supra note 33. "Presumptive" sentencing stat-
utes have been enacted by the federal government, which has also recently adopted a
controversial set of sentencing guidelines. See T. HUTCHISON & D. YELLEN, FED-
ERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, Title II, §§ 8.1, 8.7 (1989) (history of Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984 and Sentencing Guidelines Act of 1986).
121. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS § 5.2 commentary (1980).
122. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.40.010-450 (Supp. 1991); see Becker, Washington
State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZAGA L. REv. 289 (1979); see also
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The Alaska Legislature could easily study the Washington experi-
ence and determine whether a system of determinate juvenile disposi-
tions would be appropriate for Alaska. Certainly the reasons for
enacting a "grid" system seem to make sense. In at least one case, a
juvenile court felt frustrated by its inability to impose a short, fixed
period of detention, and chose to do so without legal authority.123 The
strong presumption against institutionalization in all but extreme cases
evidenced by the holdings in In re J.H. and R.P. v. State may have
been influenced by the knowledge that once children are institutional-
ized in Alaska, the period of confinement is often quite lengthy and
release decisions are initially committed to the Department of Health
and Social Services. l2 4 Although a grid system would not be without
its dangers or difficulties in Alaska, such a system would seem to fit
well with the determinate system now in effect in adult criminal
courts. 
125
VI. APPEALS
Alaska law allows children appeals as a matter of right in delin-
quency cases.' 2 6 The Alaska appellate rules addressing juvenile cases
provide for an expedited procedure so that cases can be briefed and
decided quicldy. 2 7 Appeals from detention orders are also heard ex-
peditiously. In A.M. v. State,128 the court held that the procedure for
adult bail appeals should be used. 129 Under this procedure, a motion
Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders To Be Punished: Some Implications of Treat-
ing Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. Rnv. 182, 193 n.56 (noting a trend toward determi-
nate sentences for juveniles in Minnesota, Texas and New York).
123. M.O.W. v. State, 645 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (five day incar-
ceration at a youth center as a condition of probation reversed on appeal).
124. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. The Department has considerable
discretion over placement decisions and presumably has similar discretion over deci-
sions on release from institutions as well. See L.C. v. State, 625 P.2d 839 (Alaska
1981); A.S. v. State, 761 P.2d 122 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (both dealing with proceed-
ings on juveniles' violations of probation).
125. See supra note 120.
126. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(i) (1990); ALASKA DEL. R. 26. Alaska Rule of
Appellate Procedure 219(b) provides that an appeal which could not be taken under
Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 202 is not permitted. Presumably, this means
that in juvenile delinquency cases the state can appeal only on the grounds that the
petition for adjudication or waiver was insufficient, or on the grounds that the disposi-
tion was too lenient. The state may also file interlocutory appeals by petitioning for
review of juvenile court decisions, such as suppression of evidence. ALASKA R. App.
P. 401-08.
127. ALASKA R. App. P. 219(g). These cases are not quite as expedited as child
custody cases, in which briefing must be completed within 20 days. Id. R. 218(f).
128. 653 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
129. Id. at 348.
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rather than a brief can be filed in the appellate court.130 The motion
must contain specific information on the nature of the case and the
child's background and prior offenses, if any.131
Despite these expedited procedures, cases are often technically
moot before the appellate courts reach a decision.1 32 Although Alaska
courts have traditionally applied the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine liberally to reach the merits of appeals, the court of
appeals has applied the mootness doctrine more strictly in recent
years. 133
As noted above, Alaska appellate courts have been very active in
delinquency cases both through decisions and by adopting procedural
rules. If recent cases are any indication, however, the Alaska courts
may be somewhat less inclined to make additional major changes in
delinquency law and procedure. 134
VII. CONCLUSION
Alaska delinquency law is much like the law of other states in
general form and structure. Alaska courts are strongly concerned
with children's procedural rights, except in waiver cases, but the delin-
quency statutes are more in line with the traditional parenspatriae role
of juvenile courts. More recent decisions indicate that the courts are
likely to protect juveniles' existing procedural rights, but are unlikely
to break new ground.
It is difficult to say what the legislature may do with delinquency
law in the future. There is some pressure to follow the lead of other
states in enacting laws mandating waiver in serious cases, but the pas-
sage of such legislation is unlikely given the resources that have been
devoted to juvenile correction facilities. The legislature may want to
130. ALASKA R. APP. P. 206(b), 207.
131. Id. R. 206(b)(1)-(8).
132. As a general rule, Alaska courts will not decide cases "where the facts have
rendered the legal issues moot." Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 53 (Alaska 1971). If a
case presents a situation which is capable of repetition, yet evades review, the Alaska
courts will decide the case on its merits if the case contains issues of public impor-
tance. In Alaska, this is referred to as the "public interest exception" to the mootness
doctrine. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d 584,
588 (Alaska 1990).
133. Compare R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 45 (Alaska 1971) (court applied public
interest exception to mootness doctrine to reach merits) with A.M. v. State, 653 P.2d
346, 348 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (court refused to apply exception and dismissed ap-
peal). In K.L.F. v. State, 790 P.2d 708, 709 n. 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990), petition for
hearing granted, No. S-3923 (Alaska July 30, 1990), the court reached the merits, but
only because it found that the child had been diligent in pursuing relief at the superior
court level, although that court did not reach a final decision on predisposition
custody.
134. See supra notes 25 & 118 and accompanying text.
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consider conforming juvenile disposition statutes to the determinate
sentencing theory of the adult criminal statutes, as Washington has
done. Although Alaska courts are progressive in recognizing due pro-
cess rights in delinquency cases, they are bound by statute to basically
two disposition options: probation or institutionalization. A system in
which there is at least some proportionality 135 between the punish-
ment and the crime would make for a fairer and more predictable ju-
venile justice system. Such a system could serve to reduce the high
number of institutionalized children in Alaska.
135. See C. SHIREMAN & F. REAMER, supra note 1, at 37-38, 118-20; supra notes
121-22 and accompanying text.
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